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THE IDES OF APRIL
Α FUNDAMENTALIST UPRISING IN ISTANBUL IN 1909?
E. J. Zürcher
The development of secularism has been a, perhaps even the, dominant theme in the
history of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic from the early Nineteenth
Century onwards.1
Before the mid-Nineteen Twenties, when the Republican government under the
leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later: Atatürk) (1881-1938) expressly sought to end the
political, social and cultural influence of Islamic institutions and to achieve a total
dominance of the secular State over those institutions, this secularisation was not a
primary aim of the policy makers, but a side effect of the policies formulated, which
were aimed at strengthening the Ottoman State through the adoption of European
methods.
These policies, which prevailed during most of the Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Century, especially during the period of the Tanzimat, or "reforms" (1839-
1878),2 were motivated primarily by two factors: Firstly, the realisation by a
number of leading statesmen and bureaucrats that the only way for the Ottoman
Empire to survive the onslaught of the European nation-states was Imitation of their
apparently successful ways and, secondly, the desire on the part of these statesmen
to gain the support of the European powers and especially Britein against external
enemies (mainly the Russian Empire) and intemal ones (first of all Muhammad Ali
Pasha, the governor of Egypt) through the adoption of measures which would inspire
confidence in Europe.
One important element of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman reforms, which
followed the famous edict of Gülhane of 1839, was formed by the creation of a
modern conscripted army and navy, equipped with European hardware and the
creation of a bureaucracy along Western, primarily French, lines.3 Together these
served to increase the hold of the central government over the provinces of the
Empire to a degree which was quite unprecedented in the history of the Middle
East.4 Even if this in itself did not necessarily constitute a secularising influence, the
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establishment of schools and academies for the training of the new civil servants and
soldiers did. The founding of these schools formed the thin edge of a wedge, which
gradually eroded the position of the ulama in education and eventually, but only in
1924, led to the complete emancipation of the educational System from the control
of the ulama.
The second important development of this period was the opening up of the
Ottoman economy to the West, or in other words its incorporation into the capitalist
world system, which followed the Ottoman-British commercial treaty of 1838.5
This, too, had a secularising influence, because the legislation and the courts
introduced to enable the foreigners to trade under conditions which were acceptable
to them, were of a Western type and functioned outside the Sharia, which, at least
theoretically, had been the basis of the Ottoman legal system in the past.
In the third place, the Ottoman reformists feit compelled to comply with Western
demands on the very sensitive issue of the relation between muslims and non-
muslims in the Empire, introducing the concept of equal Ottoman citizenship for all.
The introduction of this concept, which of course had no place in the Sharia, was a
form of radical secularisation, even if it did not strike root in the mentality of the
great majority of the Muslim, or indeed Christian population.
In the second half of the Century, especially after the Islahat Fermani edict of
1856 (which was seen as being issued under foreign pressure), these developments,
and the privileged position which the Christian minorities of the Empire managed to
gain under the aegis of the European powers, led to growing resentment to the
policies of the Tanzimat on the part of the Muslim population.6 This resentment
found expression in conspiracies, populär uprisings and anti-Christian riots such as
that in Syria in 1860, but it also played a role in the criticism of the emerging
Muslim intelligentsia, the second generation reformers who were active in the 1860's
and 70's, the so-called "Young Ottomans." The aim of the latter was to limit the
power of the new bureaucrats through the introduction of a constitutional, parliamen-
tary monarchy, which in their eyes was fundamentally consistent with Islam.7
The Young Ottoman programme was realised with the introduction of the
Ottoman constitution in 1876,8 but the new Sultan, Abdulhamid II, who had taken
Part in the discussions of the Young Ottomans himself, soon reverted to autocratic
rule, suspending constitution and parliament. Abdulhamid, while continuing the
modernisations of the Tanzimat in many ways, emphasized the Islamic character of
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his reign and of the Empire, to counterbalance the influence of Western liberal
ideas.9
Dunng his reign, the agitation for a return to constitutional and parliamentarian
rule continued, however, and even gained a far broader basis through the expansion
of modern, Western-type education in the Empire.10 The constitutional movement
started to expand rapidly in the 1890s, but in 1896 the Hamidian police succeeded
in crushing the undergound movement and for the next ten years the reformists were
active mostly as exiles: in Cairo, Geneva and first and foremost: Paris. There the
movement eventually crystallized into two distinct factions: the nationalist and
centralist one around Ahmet Riza (the Committee of Union and Progress - Ittihad ve
Terakki Djemiyeti) and the liberal and decentralist one around Prince Sabahettin (The
League for Private Initiative and Decentralisation - Teshebbüs-ü Shahsi ve Adem-i
Merkeziyet Djemiyeti).''
From 1906 onwards, the constitutional movement underwent a new period of
growth within the Empire, especially within the Ottoman armies in European
Turkey. Basically, this was an autonomous growth, but the movement merged with
the faction of Ahmet Riza and adopted its name, "Committee of Union and Pro-
gress" (C.U.P.), in 1907.n
In July 1908 this Organisation by threat of armed Intervention succeeded in
forcing the Sultan to restore the constitution and reconvene parliament. After this
revolution, the C.U.P. did not take over power itself. In the Ottoman context of
1908 junior officers and civil servants were simply not acceptable as members of
government. Neither did the Unionists see in themselves the ability to govern.
Instead they left government in the hands of a senior statesman of the old regime
with a relatively liberal reputation, Kibrisli Kämil Pasha (1832-1912), and set
themselves up as a sort of watchdog committee.'3
Thanks to their supenor Organisation, the parliamentary elections of the Autumn
of 1908 resulted in a complete Unionist victory but here, too, the Unionist influence
remained indirect rather than direct, because in many parts of the Empire they had
lo rely on local notables who allowed their names to be put forward as candidates on
the Unionist list, rather than on members of the C.U.P. itself.14
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After the astounding success of the revolution, the C.U.P. was the most powerful
force in the country, but increasingly through 1908 and the early months of 1909 it
had to contend with two types of Opposition. One was that of the followers of Prince
Sabahattin, united since September m the Ahrar Firkasi (Liberal Party),15 who had
done badly in the elections and feit increasingly frustrated. Kamil Pasha, who, like
the Liberais, resented the pressure of the C.U.P., allied himself with this group and
relations between him and the C.U.P. became increasingly strained. On February,
14th, the C.U.P. succeeded in having the Grand Vizier voted out of office in
parliament and having him replaced with Hüseym Hilmi Pasha (1855-1921), who
was close to the Committee.16 Hereafter a bitter press campaign was started by the
Opposition, which was answered by the Unionist organs in kind. On April, 6th,
Hasan Fehmi, the editor of one of the fiercest anti-Unionist papers, Serbesti, was
killed on the Galata-bridge, probably by a Unionist agent. His funeral the next day
turned into a mass demonstration against the Committee."
The second type of Opposition which faced the C.U.P. was that by conservative
religious circles, notably the lower ulama and sheykhs of the tarikats. During the
month of Ramadan, which coincided with October 1908, there were a number of
incidents and at least two serious and violent demonstrations, during which the
closure of bars and theaters, the prohibition of photography and restrictions on the
freedom of movement of women were demanded.18 On April 3d, the religious
extremists, who were already active as a group around the newspaper Volkan of the
Nakhsbandi Sheykh Derwish Wahdeti, organised themselves as the Ittihad-i Muham-
medi (Muhammadan Union), whose president was considered to be the prophet
himself.19 This group organised large-scaJe propaganda against the policies and
mentality of the Young Turks.
In spite of all this political infighting and the rising tensions of the past months,
it came as a complete surprise to Unionists and foreign observers alike, when, on the
night of 12/13 April 1909 an armed insurrection broke out in the capital in the name
of the restoration of Islam and Shana. Within twenty-four hours the insurgents took
over the capital without meeting significant Opposition from government, C.U.P. or
the Army. In the capital, the Committee seemed vanquished, but its position in the
provinces, most of all in Macedonia, remained intact and within a fortnight troops
loyal to the C.U.P. suppressed the counterrevolution and re-established the Commit-
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tee in power. In spite of the ease with which the insurrection was suppressed,
however, the 31 Mart Wak'asi, or 3Ist of March Incident, as it is known in Turkish
history because of its date in the old Rumi calendar, made a deep impression on the
reformists. The fact that a revolt in the name of Islam had been able to shake the
foundations of their regime so easily and quickly, came as a rüde shock to them.
The Kemalists, who succeeded the Unionists after the First World War and went on
to found the secular republic of Turkey, had nearly all of them been members of the
C.U.P. Therefore, the memory, or trauma, of the 1909 revolt was theirs, too. To
the supporters of secularism in Turkey the 3Ist of March incident served as a
constant reminder of the danger of Islamic fundamentalism. Even today, whenever
the secular system of government of Turkey seems threatened, references to the
incident are frequently made.
After a short descnption of the events of April, 1909, and a survey of their
possible causes and instigators, I shall address the question whether the qualification
" Fundamentalist" is adequate or even helpful in this context. At the same time, I
shall try to determine the place of the events of 1909 in the development of the
relations between Islam and the State in modern Turkey.
Quite an extensive secondary literature, both scholarly and populär, exists on the
subject, based on memoirs,20 newspaper reports and foreign archives. The Turkish
archives as yet do not seem to have been used for the study of this subject to any
extent21. For this occasion I have looked into the Dutch legation reports, kept in the
State Archives in The Hague {ÄRA).
The coverage given in these records to the insurrection and its prelude and
aftermath is quite extensive (reports being sent daily during the crisis) and, given the
limitations of intelligence gathering by a small embassy, the quality is quite remark-
able. Even lf it offers no startling revelations, it does give a detailed picture of what
happened, and a good "feel" for the period.
The crisis of April 1909 lasted for eleven days only. During the night of the
12th on the 13th of April the battalions of Macedonian troops at Tashkishla barracks
which had been brought in only a week before by the C.U.P. to replace the (su-
pposedly less reliable) Arab and Albanien troops,22 mutinied, after having taken
their officers prisoner. Together with a large number of softas, students from the
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rehgious schools, they marched to the At Meydani where the parhament buildmg
stood Durmg the morning, more and more troops and ulama joined them The
government was in disarray, did not dare to send m the loyal troops, but instead sent
the Chief of Police to listen to the demands of the mob The spokesmen of the
insurgent troops formulated six demands
- dismissal of the Grand Vizier and the Ministers of War and of the Navy
- replacement of a number of Unionist ofFicers
- replacement of the Unionist President of the Chamber of Deputies (Ahmet
Riza)
- bamshmg of a number of Unionist deputies from Istanbul
restoration of the Shana
- an amnesty for the rebelhous troops 23
Confronted with these demands, the Grand Vizier went to the palace in the afternoon
and tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the Sultan The next morning,
lt was announced that the colourless diplomat Tevfik Pasha (Okday) (1845-1936) had
been appomted Grand Vizier The War Minister m the new cabmet, Marshai Ethem
Pasha visited the soldiers at the At Meydani, praised them and promised them that all
their demands would be met24
The troops and the Sofias celebrated their victory extensively At the same time,
a pogrom against known Uniomsts developed, resultmg m the deaths of at least
twenty people, mostly officers, but also two deputies, who were mistaken for
Huseyin Cahit (Yalcm), the editor of the Unionist organ Tanin, and Ahmet Riza
The offices of the Tanin were also sacked 25
The Uniomsts went Underground or fled the capital As a result, the Chamber of
Deputies, in which the C U P held the majonty did not have a quorum Never-
theless, the deputies who did attend, at ehe instigation of the Liberal (and Albaman)
deputy Ismail Kemal Bey (Vlora) acrepted the demands of the soldiers and at the
same time lssued a proclamation, saying that Shana and constitution would be
maintained 26
From the first day on, the leaders of the Ahrar tned without success to get a
gnp on events and to prevent the insurrection from movmg mto a reactionary, anti-
constitutionahst and pro-Abdulhamid direction It should be noted, too, that the
higher rankmg ulama (those who in the ambassador's report are called "ulama", as
°Pposed to the "Ho]as" who supported the revolt), who were united in the Djemiyet-i
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Ilmiye-i Islamiye ("Society of the Islamic Scholarly Profession") never supported the
insurrection and from the 16th onwards openly denounced it.27
The C.U.P. had been driven out of Istanbul, but had kept its position in the
provinces, notably in Macedonia, and it started to take countermeasures right away.
It organised public demonstrations in the provincial towns, and showered the
parliament and palace with telegrams.28 In Macedonia especially it easily won the
Propaganda battle, convmcing the population that the constitution was in danger.
From the Fifteenth it started the Organisation of a military campaign against the
rebels. The "Action Army" (Hareket Ordusu) as it was termed, consisted of regulär
units of the Third and Second Armies, reinforced with volunteer units, which
consisted mostly of Albanians, led by Niyazi Bey, one of the heroes of the re-
volution of 1908.29 By train, these troops were moved first to Qatalca and Hadem-
köy and then to Ayastefanos (nowadays Yeshilköy) on the outskirts of Istanbul.30
The Chamber of Deputies sent a delegation to the Army headquarters to try to
prevent it from taking the city by force, but it met with no positive response, after
which the members of the delegation decided to stay in Ayastefanos and issued a call
to their colleagues to join them. From the 22nd onwards both chambers of par-
liament sat together in Ayastefanos as a "National Assembly" (medjlis-i umumi-i
milh).31
In the early morning of the 24th of April, the Action Army began the occupation
of the city. It did not encounter rnuch resistance - only at the Taksim and Tashkishla
barracks did the resistance amount to anything. At four o'clock in the aftemoon the
last rebels had surrendered.32
In the aftermath of the suppression of the revolt, and under martial law, two
courts martial were instituted, which convicted and executed a large number of the
rebels, includmg Derwish Wahdeti. Α number of Ahrar leaders were arrested, but
set free again under British pressure. On the 27th, the two chambers of parliament,
still sitting together, deposed Sultan Abdulhamid, who was succeeded by his younger
brother Mehmet Resat.33
Now, after this brief overview of the events, let us try to summarize the causes
of the revolt, the demands of the insurgents and the reaction of the Unionists, in
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order to establish the character of the insurgency and lts place in modern Turkish
history
Several different causes for the events of April 1909 can be discemed Different
groups had become disenchanted with the constitutional regime for different reasons
The overthrow of the old regime m ltself had hurt those who had earned a hvmg or
enjoyed Status as members of the Hamidian apparatus, including the thousand of
government spies active m Istanbul, who had supphed the Sultan with üien jurnals
The rationahsmg pohcies of the new government, which aimed at endmg the
overstaffing of the government departments which had been the result of the
favountism of the old regime, had already made thousands of civil servants of all
ranks jobless In a city hke Istanbul, where government was the mam mdustry this
had far-reaching consequences
In the army, the mam source of trouble was the fnction between the mekteph
offkers, who had been tramed in the mihtary schools and academy, and the alayli
officers, who had risen through the ranks The latter had been favoured by the old
regime, being paid regularly and stationed in the First Army in and around Istanbul,
while the former had been mistrusted (nghtly so, because lt was these modern
educated officers who brought about the constitutional revolution of 1908) Now the
mekteph officers had taken over Many of the alayli officers had been dismissed or
demoted and even worse the whole System of promotion from the ranks was
discontinued The troops themselves, too, had reason for discontent They had been
used to the very slack disciphne and relaxet atmosphere of the old army and were
now confronted with young officers who wanted to impose Prussian traimng
methods, among other things abohshing the pauses for ablutions and prayers dunng
the exercises 34
While no exphcitly seculanst Ieg'slation had been enacted m the eight months
smce the constitutional revolution, the lower ulama clearly feit threatened by the
change in atmosphere, which the constitutional revolution had brought about One
particular measure, which aroused feehng among this group was that, by which
students at the rehgious schools who did not pass their exams in time, were no
longer exempted from mihtary Service 35
The discord withm the Young Turk ranks, with the Ahrar opposmg what they
saw as the irresponsible pohcies and the monopoly of powei of the Umomsts also
helped to create the atmosphere m which the revolt could take place The debate
between the two factions grew more and more fierce m the first months of 1909
This verbal extremism, which could easily spill over into real violence (as in the
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Hasan Fehmi affair) helped to create a climate in which pohtical Opposition came to
be regarded as treason The Dutch legation several times noted that m this way the
Young Turks would leave the field open to the conservatives 36 The exaggerated
and immoderate pohtical debate, with lts personal attacks, was charactenstic both
of the Young Turk era and of the Kemahst penod (And even, one might add, of
Turkish pohtics of recent years)
Fmally, one contnbuting factor to the cnsis was the fact that the Uniomsts were
out of touch with important parts of public opinion, and thus were completely taken
by surprise by the discontent which existed even among their own Macedonian
troops The Young Turks m all guises (Umonists, Liberais and Kemahsts) were
always very much an enhghtened ehte, who saw lt as their task to educate the
raasses Their positivist, liberal and nationalst Vision was not supported by what, in
a European context, would be considered lts natural base, an emergmg mdigenous
bourgeoisie, but forced on a conservative and deeply rehgious population from
above
Thus, a number of factors can be pomted to as havmg contributed to a climate,
in which the msurrection could take place But who was or who were the actual
mstigators7 This has been the subject of a lot of speculation, both at the time of the
revolt and later 37
In all lts Statements, the C U Ρ charactensed the msurrection as an instance of
"reaction" (irtidja) It laid the blame squarely on the shoulders of Sultan Abdulhamid
and the rehgious Opposition of the Ittihad ι Muhammadi of Sheykh Wahdeti At the
time, the hand of the Sultan was also seen m the fact, reported on by the Dutch
legation that the msurgents had ample funds and that the soldiers had apparently been
paid in gold 38 Nevertheless, it IS clear that all through the eleven days of the
revolt, the Sultan acted with extreme caution While he did not openly disavow the
soldiers, he never openly supported their demands or tried to lead their movement
When the Action Army entered the city, he apparently greeted it with lehef and
ordered the palace troops not to offer resistance All through the revolt he made ehe
Impression of bemg fnghtened and demoralised y) In his memoirs, he later demed
havmg had anythmg to do with the revolt
Conservative opinion in Turkey has sometimes aecused the Uniomsts of stage
managmg the whole revolt in order to be able to estabhsh a dietatorship, adduemg
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the fact that the revolt started in the Macedoman battalhons as proof40 This,
however, seems fanciful, in view of the patent unpreparedness of leading Uniomsts,
who had to flee or go Underground, some of them just escaping being lynched. No
trace of evidence for this thesis has ever been found.
The demands, formulated by the insurgents and the evidence given before the
Courts Martial and in the memoirs of Opposition leaders point to the pohtical
Opposition, the Ahrar as the pnme movers41 The selective way, in which the
insurgents attacked Unionist mdividuals and Offices also supports this view. At the
same time, lt IS clear that the rehgious Opposition around Sheykh Wahdeti and the
Ittihad-ι Muhammedi played a very important part m organizmg the upnsmg and m
rousmg the troops 42 Most probably the liberal Opposition was the original mstigator
of the revolt. Overestimatmg lts own strength, lt thought lt could use the rehgious
groups for that purpose, but soon after the Start of the revolt, it became clear that lt
was in no position to exert control. The wilhngness of one group of basically
seculanst reformers to conclude an opportunistic alhance with Islamic groups m lts
struggle for power with another group of reformers, in the mistaken belief that less
sophisticated rehgious groups can be easily manipulated is again a recurrmg phenom-
enon in the pohtics of modern Turkey
There were persistent rumours in 1909, reflected in the hterature on the episode,
that Great Bntain was behmd the upnsmg The gold distnbuted among the troops
made many people suspicious and attention was drawn to the close links between the
leaders of the Ahrar and the British embassy. No hard evidence of Bntish ιηνοΐ-
vement has ever come to hght, however.
Now I come to the question of the fundamentallst Islamic character of the revolt
There is no denymg that the call for remstatement of the Shana played a large role
m the msurrection, which was seen by Uniomsts and foreign observers such as the
Dutch envoy ahke as a reactionary I^iamic movement On the other hand, there are
good grounds to consider this label madequate Firstly, as I mentioned earher, there
is strong evidence that the Liberals, who were no moie Islamic or fundamentallst
than the Uniomsts, mstigated the revolt Secondly, there is no relation whatsoever
between the call for the Shana and the other demands put forward Thirdly, the
insurgents never formulated specific demands for the way the Shana should be
miplemented Neither did they demand the dissolution of parhament and/or the
Prorogation of the constitution The function of the call for the Shana seems to have
been hmited to that of legitimizmg the upnsmg and providmg it with a rallying-cry
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The C.U.P., in its counter-propaganda, immediately identified the insurrection
as irtidja (political reaction), which endangered constitution and parliament. This
may have been in part a psychological reaction. Both their own positivist ideology
and their history of struggle against Sultan Abdulhamid's regime had conditioned
them to see religious conservatism as the main threat to the realisation of their
ideals. The 31 March Incident seems to have been a genuinely traumatic experience
for the Unionists. It cannot be denied, however, that labeling the insurrection as
reactionary and Islamic also had practical political advantages: it enabled the
Committee to isolate their opponents by posing as the defenders of the constitution,
thereby attracting the support of those Young Turks who shared their secularist
outlook, but had become disenchanted with the Committee's policies after the
revolution. This way they could eliminate the liberal Opposition by identifying them
with the reaction. It also gave them a chance to dethrone Abdulhamid, something
which they had not been able to do in 1908 and which was seen by them (and also
by neutral observers) as essential to the consolidation of their position.43
In both respects, the use of the call for the Sharia as battle-cry by the Opposition
and the labeling of the revolt as irtidja by the Unionists, an interesting comparison
is afforded by the insurrection of Sheykh Sait (a Nahskbandi sheykh, just like
Derwish Wahdeti) in Eastern Turkey in February 1925.44 This revolt was at least
partly Kurdish-nationalist in character and it was motivated by discontent with the
social and economic Situation in the Kurdish provinces. Nevertheless, the leaders
used the call for the Sharia as a rallying-cry. The rebellion was immediately labeled
as irtidja by the then Turkish govemment (which consisted of former Unionists) and
subsequently suppressed with the utmost severity. The Prime Minister, Fethi
(Okyar), explicitly compared the Situation to that of April 1909 in a speech in the
National Assembly.45 It was on this occasion that, through an amendment to the
High Treason Law, the political use of religion was outlawed in Turkey for the first
time (it has remained so ever since). The High Treason Law was subsequently used
to suppress the liberal Opposition within the National Assembly, the Progressive
Republican Party, the left-wing Opposition outside the Assembly and the Opposition
press, even though none of these could be linked to the Kurdish rebellion.
After the suppression of both the Islamic, the socialist and the liberal Opposition
in 1925, the Kemalist regime intensified its drive to crush institutionali2Ed Islam.
Unfortunately, this policy also strengthened the tendency, already evident in 1909,
for Islam to become the vehicle for Opposition to the policies of an authoritarian
ÄRA, 562/199(19.4.1909).
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State, and so, in turn, to make the supporters of the secular State allergic to expres-
sions of Islamic feeling. This seems to be the vicious circle in which the debate on
the relation between Islam and State has been caught in Turkey for much of this
Century.
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